The second edition of John Snow’s On the Mode of Communication of Cholera\(^1\) is now regarded as “a classic that must always fascinate and inspire the student of epidemiology and preventive medicine.”\(^2\) Yet when it was published in 1855 it was not a success, and, in view of its present reputation, it is understandable that historians have been reluctant to accept the obvious explanation — that the book failed because it was not worth buying.

Macintosh\(^3\) has listed all the reasons put forward for laying the blame on Snow’s contemporaries. They were too much preoccupied with theories of foul air ever to think of cholera being spread by drinking water; there were men of ill will acting on behalf of the water companies; Snow was personally out of favor with his medical colleagues; he was in conflict with the scientific attitude of the age. “Snow,” we read, “was a man out of his time. . . . In this dark period of British history it is surprising that any advance at all was made towards the removal of causes of disease or the improvement of health.”

None of these explanations is altogether convincing. All discoveries meet with opposition of some kind. Snow, at least, was honored with the presidency of the Westminster Medical Society and was the attendant of Queen Victoria. His work on anesthetics, as, indeed, the novel concept of anesthesia itself, was received with a readiness which does not suggest any inherent contemporary prejudice against scientific invention.

Looked at more closely, it becomes increasingly clear that Snow, the epidemiologist, was in a very different position from Snow, the anesthetist. His early training had equipped him remarkably well for the opportunities presented by ether and chloroform, whereas his theory of the transmission of cholera, arrived at almost intuitively,\(^4\) caught him unprepared and showed up his weaknesses. It is clear also that the inclinations of many of his modern admirers have prevented them from accepting the fact that the theory might be a very good theory, yet the book which contained it might still be a very bad book.  

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Case History

The John Snow who is familiar to most readers was largely concocted in the imagination of his friend and biographer, Benjamin Ward Richardson.\(^5\) “All who knew him,” wrote Richardson, “said he was a quiet man, very reserved, a clever man but not easy to be understood, and very peculiar.” And although all present-day writers are necessarily indebted to this prejudiced witness for much of their material, wherever possible an effort will be made to break away from his tyranny.

[649b] Snow and His Critics

When London, in 1848, was under the threat of a new epidemic of cholera, the Westminster
Medical Society devoted several meetings to the subject. Snow’s thoughts, however, were still on ether and chloroform and he took no part in the preliminary discussions, other than to remark on the similarity between cholera and ether asphyxia.\textsuperscript{19}

He began to tackle the problem seriously towards the end of 1848, and it is evident that he once again adapted the approach of a toxicologist. Did the poison act locally and, if so, on what organ? Or did it first enter the blood stream? He concluded that it acted locally on the alimentary mucosa because, in his experience, the initial symptoms were always referred to the abdomen. And because [649b/650a] the effects of the poison could be counteracted in the early stages by agents such as chalk and opium, which were known to act locally, he concluded that it did not enter the blood stream. To explain the general symptoms he adopted the theory which had recently been advanced\textsuperscript{20} that these all followed the loss of fluid through the intestinal wall.

Having established that the poison acted primarily on the stomach, he deduced that it must get there by being swallowed; and since it did not leave the alimentary canal by passing into the blood stream, it must be discharged in the vomit and feces. The next step was obvious. To reach other victims, all it had to do was enter the sewage system and pass thence to the drinking water — a circulatory process which had been well recognized by fastidious Londoners for a number of years.\textsuperscript{21}

The new theory was virtually complete. He now had to work out some method of proving it. The most direct way was to demonstrate the poison itself in patients and drinking water. As Bdd had said, “the detection of the actual cause of the disease, and the determination of its nature were all that was wanting to convert his views into a real discovery.”\textsuperscript{22} But here he was in difficulty. Too close an association with Budd, Swayne, and Brittan, who had independently suggested a water-borne fungus infection, would deprive him of the sole credit of being the first to publish the theory. And since, in any case, the idea of a fungus was soon discredited, he felt it unwise to look any further in that direction.\textsuperscript{4}

It would have been impracticable, too, to follow up his pathologic arguments. He must have sensed their inherent weakness and gave three different accounts of how he made his discovery.\textsuperscript{1, 21, 24} Besides, he was almost wholly ignorant of the contemporary pathologic literature relating to cholera. The idea that it was a local affection of the intestines, which he first imagined was entirely his own, was an old-standing foible of his fellow anesthetist, Prothero Smith,\textsuperscript{21} and had long been discounted because of the numerous cases of persons who had died without showing alimentary symptoms. Attempts had also been made to produce the disease in men and animals through the ingestion of [650a/650b] cholera discharges.\textsuperscript{28, 27} All these had been unsuccessful.

Although Snow must have very soon become aware of these objections he seems to have chosen to disregard them. Instead, he decided to establish his theory by means of a series of epidemiologic investigations.

Even here circumstances were against him. He had no previous training for the work and soon found that it was impossible to trace the route of infection from case to case while an
epidemic was raging in a crowded city. (William Budd, independently of Snow, by studying the connection between small groups of cases in a sparsely-populated area, had relatively little difficulty in coming to the conclusion that cholera was spread by drinking water.}\(^{21}\) Snow, therefore, had to limit the scope of his inquiry to demonstrating that cholera spread most extensively in those areas where there were the greatest facilities for swallowing excretions.\(^{28}\) Such an investigation, however clearly it established the relationship between polluted water and cholera, was not directed at the main point of the controversy; it could never decide between his own theory, that water was the vehicle of transmission, and that of his opponents, that polluted water predisposed to infection from another source.

Snow began by collecting particulars of a number of small incidents in various parts of London and finally undertook a more elaborate analysis of the Broad-street outbreak centered round a pump in the Soho district. In the course of these inquiries he had the idea of relating the mortality from cholera to the water supply in South London. There were two water companies in this area. The one was supplied from an adjacent part of the Thames, while the other had recently gone to a purer source further up river. Snow described the advantages of this situation:

“The intermixing of the water supply of the Southwark and Vauxhall Company with that of the Lambeth Company over an extensive part of London, admitted of the subject being sifted in such a way as to yield the most incontrovertible proof on one side or the other. In the sub-districts enumerated . . . as being supplied by both companies, the mixing of the supply is of the most inti-

[650b/651a] mate kind. The pipes of each company go down all the streets, and nearly all the courts and alleys. . . . Each company supplies both rich and poor, both large houses and small. There is no difference either in the condition or occupation of the persons receiving the water of the different companies.”\(^{1}\)

He had only to compare the mortality in those houses receiving the improved supply with those whose supply was unchanged. “No experiment, he wrote, could have been devised which would more thoroughly test the effect of water supply on the progress of cholera than this, which circumstances placed ready made before the observer.”\(^{1}\)

The comparison which he then made, together with a description of the Broad-street outbreak and several smaller incidents, make up the bulk of the 1855 edition of *On the Mode of Communication of Cholera*.

The book was duly received by the medical press. One of the most thoughtful reviews was provided by Parkes in the *British and Foreign Medical Review*.\(^{29}\) After pointing out that none of his readers could be ignorant of Snow’s theory, nor of the perseverance and energy with which he had sought for facts to corroborate his view, he felt that it was the duty of the reviewer to look for “anything hollow or unsound in the facts brought forward, or in the arguments founded upon them.”

Parkes then referred to the instances quoted by Snow to show that cholera tended to select houses whose water supply was known to be impure. He considered that Snow had neglected the most elementary epidemiologic principles. Of one of these instances he wrote:

“In this example, as in almost all the other cases adduced by Dr. Snow, we miss the very necessary information as to the number of persons resident in each house; . . . In six houses there
were altogether twenty-four cases of cholera, in the seventh house (one with its own pump) only one case. For anything we are told to the contrary, however, there may have been only a single case in one of the six houses, and a greater number than the average in some of the others. If this were so, the power and force of the argument at once disappears.” [651a/651b]

Parkes next criticized Snow’s conclusions from the Broad-street outbreak. Although Snow had shown that the greatest mortality occurred in the area supplied by a particular pump, he had not proved that this pump was actually contaminated, nor had he eliminated other sources for what was obviously a locally diffused poison. He had not explained why the disease reached its peak and then declined without any change in the water supply. Finally, as Parkes said, “There are, indeed, so many pumps in this district, that wherever the outbreak had taken place, it would most probably have had one pump or other in its vicinity.”

The main difficulty, however, was with the inquiry into the South London water supplies. Parkes’ first impression, and that of most other readers of the book, was that Snow had actually compared the subdistricts which he had described, those in which the supplies of the two companies were intimately intermingled. But this was not so.

What happened was this: Snow obtained, from the Registrar General, the addresses of those dying from cholera in these subdistricts and then ascertained the source of water supply for the houses where the deaths had occurred. He then had to find the total number of houses supplied by each company, but here he ran into trouble:

“A return had been made to Parliament of the entire number of houses supplied with water by each of the Water Companies, but as the number of houses which they supplied in particular districts was not stated, I found that it would be necessary to carry my inquiry into all the districts to which the supply of either Company extends, in order to show the full bearing of the facts brought out in those districts where the supply is intermingled.”

On reperusing the relevant passages, Parkes realized what Snow had done and that the experiment, which fortune had presented to the observer and which appeared so conclusive, had never been carried out. It was true that the mortality rate of 5 per 10,000 houses supplied by the Lambeth Company was strikingly less than the 71 per 10,000 of the Southwark and Vauxhall Company in the figures which Snow actually [651b/652a] presented. This was certainly impressive, but, as Parkes said, “We doubt if the comparison can safely be made, for the Lambeth Company supplies, to a considerable extent, a good neighbourhood on elevated ground . . . while the Southwark and Vauxhall Company supplies the greater part of the poorest, lowest and marshiest district in London.”

A year later Snow repaired his omission by publishing details for every sub-district and amply confirmed his original statement. This step, as Bradford Hill² has pointed out, was fundamental to the argument. Is it not a little unfair to Snow’s contemporaries to forget that it was Parkes, the critic, and not Snow who first called attention to its importance?

Parkes, although exacting in his criticism, seems to have shown a remarkable understanding of the problems of an author who was clearly less familiar with epidemiologic methods than he was himself. In conclusion he wrote:

“We have already said, that from the positive evidence adduced by Dr. Snow, we were unable to do more than conclude that he had rendered the transmission of cholera by water an
hypothesis worthy of inquiry; we cannot draw any other conclusion from his researches on water
supply, than that the predisposing effects of impurity of water are also rendered highly probable.
We may be mistaken in this, and the evidence which seems weak to us may not be so to others. If
so, when additional evidence shall be given, we shall receive it with the greatest pleasure; for
though we think Dr. Snow’s hypothesis, if proved, cannot explain all the phenomena of the spread
of cholera, it would yet clear up some of the mysterious phenomena of its diffusion. Its
establishment would therefore be an immense gain to science, and, we need not add, an important
service to the State.”

The Growth of a Legend
The answer seems plain enough. The book did not sell because it contained very little that Snow
had not already said many times, because its arguments were inconclusive, and because it was
difficult to read. The theory which it contained had always been treated with
respect by responsible authorities, 30, 31 [652a/652b] and if they withheld their wholehearted
approval it was because the time had not come for it to be incontrovertibly established. There were
many other theories with apparently equal claims on their attention.

Why, then, has the fate of the book aroused so much resentment in our own generation?
Partly because the book itself has been overvalued. It has given many modern readers their sole
contact with the period in which it was written. They are not likely to be wearied with page upon
page of quotation from Simpson’s “Asiatic Cholera” in support of the already accepted principle of
contagion. 32 They are able to fill in the gaps in his reasoning with the comforting knowledge that
Snow was, after all, right.

In part, also, we have been misled by the powerful imagination of Benjamin Ward
Richardson. Richardson had two missions in life. One was to justify his own eccentric opinions.
The other was to create romantic images out of relatively unpromising medical prototypes. Snow
served both purposes. He could be presented to the public as an unrecognized genius; a genius, in
fact, who was so peculiar that only Richardson had the discernment to realize his worth. “It was
my privilege,” he wrote, “during the life of Dr. Snow to stand on his side. It is now my duty as a
biographer . . . to claim for him . . . the entire originality of the discovery of a connection between
impure water supply and choleraic disease.” 5

On the other hand, he could become the hero of any number of Richardsonian charades. He
was the “scientific unfortunate” who was eager for the few crumbs of ether practice which could be
spared by the bustling druggist. He was the Victorian Pied Piper who confronted the vestry of St.
James with his scheme for ridding them of the plague which menaced their doors. These most un-
Snow-like figures do nothing but confuse the serious historian.

Perhaps the most significant factor, however, is the importance that Snow now has for
many epidemiologists. His work on cholera has been cited as one of the crucial contributions of the
epidemiologic method to medical knowledge. 33 It has been repeatedly claimed that the
demonstration that typhoid fever and cholera could be water-borne [652b/653a] rested on the
establishment of significant associations. For example, “It was this significant association of
cholera incidence with water supply that led. before the organism of cholera had been discovered,
to his thesis that cholera was water-borne." 34 Or, "This control (of cholera) was suggested by ensuring that people did not drink water that had been contaminated by sewage, and this action was suggested by the painstaking collection of social data which showed a frequent association of contaminated water supplies with epidemics. In short, social action based on social observation proved to be an effective means of prevention before the causes of the illness were understood in technical detail." 35

It may be remembered that in Snow’s case the social data were collected between 1849 and 1855, the theory was formulated in 1848, while the Lambeth Water Company placed its proposals for obtaining a purer source of supply before Parliament in 1847. 30 These dates are not unimportant.

One last quotation deserves notice. Bradford Hill, the medical statistician, has written, “For close upon 100 years we have been free in this country from epidemic cholera, and it is a freedom which, basically, we owe to the logical thinking, acute observations and simple sums of Dr. John Snow.” 2 In fact, by forestalling William Budd, Snow advanced our understanding of the spread of cholera by exactly 29 days. 4

To insist on historic accuracy in these matters is not to discredit John Snow. Snow possessed undoubted merit, as Macaulay might have said, “a real merit, and a merit of a very rare, though not of a very high kind.” 37 And if we replace the man himself by some elegant cipher, however well-meaning our intentions, we are denying ourselves acquaintanceship with one of the most fascinating and human characters in medical history.

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References [the original article did not include the underlinings and quotation marks; the order and punctuation has also been altered occasionally to fit modern style requirements.]